[–] crote 2 days ago
[–] terom 1 day ago
Given, without any network level DHCP guard configuration, you could likely also send your own DHCPOFFER and just tell it to PXE-boot your own image :) I suppose for some trusted-boot threat scenarios code execution at the UEFI level is a bigger issue. No idea how modern UEFI PXE-boot deals with signed images.
[–] trollbridge 2 days ago
[–] cestith 1 day ago
[–] nicce 2 days ago
[–] kikdij 2 days ago
What we _can_ do, though, while the OS is running is detecting that bogus large ICMP packets are sent continuously. At least, this would be early warning that a reboot may be risky without disabling PXE.
[–] KaiserPro 1 day ago
[–] cowlevel 1 day ago
[–] KaiserPro 14 hours ago
This exploit is a unicast packet, which is unsolicited. For NAT, you probably don't need to do much. for ipv6 you'll need to make sure that your firewall doesn't blindly pass on ICMP ie make sure its a stateful firewall.
[–] Jolter 2 days ago
[–] preisschild 2 days ago
especially in free/open source software like edk2
[–] JeremyNT 1 day ago
This is something that shouldn't be possible in the real world because any sysadmin should know not to do this, but guaranteed there are at least some small time operations with a couple of colo'd servers that only have single interfaces serving public traffic, and the intern who set them up didn't know what a boot order was or what "PXE" even did.
[–] jeroenhd 2 days ago
[–] voidUpdate 2 days ago
[–] Jolter 2 days ago
This may sound like a movie-plot threat in 2020, but perhaps in 2026 it’s less unlikely?
There’s also the theft scenario, as indicated in the article, or the supply chain attack scenario. I don’t know how feasible it would be for a buyer to validate the integrity of the hardware they just racked up if they can’t trust secure boot?
[–] syshyk 2 days ago
The chaining to get something like this to work is pretty up there.
So you need to 1) Have a server which boots from PXE, 2) Have it do PXE on the same interface used for connections to the internet, 3) Lack a firewall filtering out unexpected or malformed ICMP packages(?), and 4) Do it at the exact moment the physical server is rebooting.
Seems like it is basically zero attack surface when it comes to remotely compromising a server. A client device, on the other hand, would be way easier to exploit, and being able to fool Secure Boot would be very interesting to people trying to bypass DRM or cheat in video games, and of course Evil Maids and security agencies.