The general population typically are doves because they can't see the consequences 10-50 years out.
My PhD bud, a Bernie supporter, thinks we should have put boots on the ground by now. I generally agree.
I lived through North Korea getting nuclear weapons in my lifetime. Before they were the end of a joke, today we have to care about the opinions of that backwater. (And I read international relations structural realists as much as I drink coffee... The job of the hegemon is to maintain the status quo.)
[–] varnaud 3 days ago
Nukes, (or thousands of artillery pointed at densely populated areas allied with a country with nukes) are the surest way maintain sovereignty in the mad world we live in.
[–] fmajid 3 days ago
[–] protocolture 3 days ago
The plan in Iran was always self sufficiency.
[–] jcranmer 3 days ago
One of the striking features of the last decade or so of global politics is the willingness of middle powers to arm and fuel regional conflicts, so I think it entirely plausible that a world where middle powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran gain nuclear weapons is one where, say, the Sudanese Civil War involves nukes.
[–] fyredge 3 days ago
I suspect that this belief has the same level of thought put into it as the "general populace". The crux of the issue is not Iran's nuclear proliferation, it's the hegemon's unreliability.
The US had the JCPOA, had allies for deterrence, and unilaterally decided to discard them in the name of inflation. One might argue that the electorate has decided that the US should no longer be a hegemon, and yet the administration still impose it's will on others.
There was a time when I believed that Iran was not a rational actor. That is not the case now. I can only hope that there are enough checks and balances to prevent other actors from acting too irrationally.
[–] delecti 3 days ago
[–] bluGill 3 days ago
[–] jcranmer 3 days ago
[–] spiderice 3 days ago
[–] bigyabai 3 days ago
...which is why we (used to) have the JCPOA. Attacking Iran will have no effect if they can mine uranium domestically and build centrifuges themselves.
[–] bigyabai 3 days ago
Diplomacy was a proven path to prevent Iran from reaching for nuclear deterrence. The plan worked well for America and Iran, which is probably what motivated Likud to escalate the situation and force them both to pick sides.
[–] themaninthedark 3 days ago
>The controversial gas pipeline Nord Stream 2 (NS2) has become the symbol of Germany’s widely criticised energy and security policy, which sought to build political bridges through trade and at the same time supply companies with cheap fuels. However, it drove the country into a fatal dependence on Russian oil and gas. Years later, government documents from the 2010s and early 2020s reported by Süddeutsche Zeitung showed that former chancellor Angela Merkel sought to portray her government as neutral and lacking competence in regards to the "business project" Nord Stream 2 to the outside world and European partners, while supporting increased gas trade with Russia through several actions.
https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/gas-pipeline-nord...
[–] bigyabai 3 days ago
[–] throw0101c 3 days ago
After the JCPOA the stockpile went to zero (esp. >5% enrichment):
* https://www.statista.com/chart/23528/irans-stockpile-of--low...
* https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/status-irans-nuclear-...
* https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2020/11/18/the-de...
One year after the US left JCPOA (during Trump 1.0) the stockpile started going up again.
[–] delecti 3 days ago
The level of enrichment they've been doing is higher than they need for power generation but it also isn't nearly enough to make nukes. A more reasonable explanation (given the assessments they aren't working on nukes) is that they were being deliberately provocative.
> So far as we know they never actually built one but they absolutely could and this was done under the previous leader
Right, they could, and didn't. Why? It was only 7 years from the discovery of fission to a proof of concept in the form of the trinity test. Either you assume a level of incompetence entirely divorced from Iran's efficacy on the international stage, or you accept they weren't trying.
[–] yyyk 3 days ago
Enrichment % is very misleading. Natural is about 0.7%. 3.5% is halfway to 90%. The distance from 60% to 90% is tiny.
That's because the distance is calculated using the quantity of raw material that needs to be filtered and not the enrichment percent, the more pure, the less material needed, hence smaller distance to 90%.
>Right, they could, and didn't. Why?
Some people worked hard to ensure the latter would be very inadvisable for Iran. Being so close isn't a stable equilibrium though.
[–] labcomputer 2 days ago
Every enrichment process drops in efficiency as the enrichment increases, asymptotically approaching that process's enrichment ceiling.
That's why nobody uses thermal diffusion to enrich uranium: It's by far the easiest method (you can do it with 1800's technology), but the practical maximum enrichment fraction is too low for anything useful (other than providing feedstock to better enrichment processes).
That's also the reason a centrifuge enrichment plant uses warehouses full of cascaded centrifuges: The centripetal force inside the centrifuge is working against a diffusion gradient, so each stage only gives a small percentage decrease of the "derichment" fraction.
Once you pass 50%, you stop looking for U-235 needles in a haystack to keep and start looking for U-238 needles in a haystack to throw away.
[–] fmajid 3 days ago
[–] themaninthedark 3 days ago
[–] bigyabai 3 days ago
[–] themaninthedark 2 days ago
Fatwa was put in place in 2003, Fordow construction was started 2006.
In the words of Obama in 2009: “The size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful program,” then US President Barack Obama said in 2009
So who do I believe; a Supreme Leader who says they will not build nuclear weapons or my lying eyes...
Or perhaps you are saying that the Supreme Leader didn't have control over his country and some rebel faction was able to build that with out his knowledge?
[–] themaninthedark 3 days ago
>A U.S. intelligence assessment says Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons at the moment but has ramped up activities that could help it develop them. https://apnews.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-intelligence-b506...
So they were not actively building a nuke, only getting all the pieces together to build one ready....
Prior to the deal: >Iran initially possessed centrifuges sufficient for one nuclear weapon, but not for nuclear power. https://web.archive.org/web/20190709050018/https://www.polit...
After the deal was broken by Trump and Biden was trying to restart it.... >2023 : An IAEA report on the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant found that two cascades of IR-6 centrifuges were configured in a way "substantially different" from what Iran had previously declared. Iran claimed the difference was due to a human error.
>On 4 March(2023), Grossi met with Raisi and other top Iranian officials. Earlier, IAEA had detected uranium particles enriched up to 83.7% at Fordow. In the meantime, Iran gave assurances that it would reinstall monitoring equipment at sensitive locations.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_nuclear_deal
[–] yyyk 3 days ago
Perhaps that's an acceptable cost of avoiding higher gas prices right now - except Iran would have had the capacity to decide these at will. It's a fair choice, but best to be aware of the consequences.
[–] AngryData 3 days ago
[–] yyyk 3 days ago
Why would Iran want to do it? Iran could absolutely control Hormuz* and get a nuke at will** under the deal. At that point it can avoid sanctions by threatening the Gulf. Or demand other concessions for allowing the Gulf to operate. That's what it tries to do now, but from a much weaker position compared to the deal timeline.
* Take the real life prewar Iranian missile and drone strength, assume Iran had an extra couple of hundreds of billions to pour into it, no import limits by the UN, a less restive populace, etc.
** Breakout timeline being a week at most at end of expiry timeline. Probably the only way to keep the Gulf independent at that scenario would have been nuclear deterrence.
>If not, why would they even bother to follow the agreement in the first place?
Because Iran wasn't anywhere strong enough at the time to risk a war, but the existence of the agreement and general developments would have predictably changed the power balance in its favor.
>The legality of what they do has never been a consideration
Well, if you decide something is legal, it's much tougher to change one's mind and stop it later.
[–] hardbass 3 days ago
[–] yyyk 2 days ago
[–] hardbass 2 days ago