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points by LoganDark 1 day ago | 0 comments

Good on Apple for providing such a detailed article. I disagree that they're doing badly by not updating this file remotely on current software versions in the wild -- most likely their Rapid Security Responses / Background Security Improvements framework does not already support this file, which is why they state a full operating system update will be required. Most likely that will be fixed for the future, but in the meantime, being transparent and open about what administrators can do about this now is the RIGHT APPROACH in this situation, and no other vendor has been nearly as thorough about this.

[–] agwa 1 day ago

Google, Microsoft, Mozilla, several TLS libraries and language runtimes, and even many Linux distros run by volunteers had this issue comprehensively fixed over a week ago: https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/#developers

Meanwhile, it's unsafe to run `git clone` on macOS unless you manually edit some files, and then edit them again after a macOS update puts the dangerous root certificates back.

In what world has Apple been the most "thorough"?

[–] LoganDark 1 day ago

Apple has been the most thorough in documenting this transparently and honestly. They didn't have the process for updating that file in the wild, and most likely that will be fixed.

Apple security updates, especially automatic ones, likely don't have the capability to simply write to arbitrary files on the system or run arbitrary commands at install time. Of all vendors, certainly from Apple I'd expect this.

Most likely, other vendors either already used a similar store as the root of trust system-wide (didn't have their own separate security stacks), or their security updates do have the ability to write anywhere or do anything.

And of course, Linux distros and other platforms where the component can be updated separately from the operating system have an even easier time.

This is not Apple intentionally leaving terminal users high and dry. The article literally is the proof otherwise while they no-doubt work on a better solution.

[–] fg137 1 day ago

There are so many "likely" in this comment that I don't know if I should care about a single word at all. Looks pure speculation if not fiction to me.

Looking forward to a comment that is much more grounded than substantial than this.

[–] LoganDark 1 day ago

The article states a software update will be required to fix the store:

> can still accept these certificates until a future software update

This suggests they don't have the capability to patch it with Rapid Security Responses / Background Security Improvements, given that they haven't.

Sure, I speculate that they likely would have already if they could have. Sure, I speculate that if they couldn't have, they might add the capability for the future. Sure, I speculate about why they wouldn't have already had a process for this. Whatever whatever. Disregard all that if you want, but the fact remains in the article.

[–] thenewnewguy 1 day ago

All of that is Apple's fault - they designed and created MacOS. It's not like they're publishing to a third party platform.

Why would I judge Apple only on the quality of this docs page (which is good) but not on their poor work that resulted in this situation in the first place?

[–] LoganDark 1 day ago

This is a legacy BSD store that macOS inherited. Apple has their own security stack that already responded to the incident within 2 hours in most cases, which means all first-party and most third-party apps were already covered. They seemingly just didn't have a mechanism to update the legacy BSD store out-of-band, which is more of an oversight than "poor work".

[–] thenewnewguy 1 day ago

Apple created and designed the update system for their operating system from scratch. The fact it doesn't include the ability to update a security-critical file quickly is entirely their fault.

Most (if not all) of the popular BSDs managed to ship the update ages ago. I would expect a trillion dollar company like Apple to have better and more thoughtful engineering than random volunteer projects.

[–] LoganDark 17 hours ago

> Apple created and designed the update system for their operating system from scratch. The fact it doesn't include the ability to update a security-critical file quickly is entirely their fault.

Sure. It's not their fault for failing now to use a capability that doesn't exist, though. I feel like the difference is lost on some people, but they're already in this situation.

[–] antiframe 1 day ago

They didn't inherit it. They chose it. If you choose to build on something, you should support it, and support it well.

[–] Sohcahtoa82 1 day ago

"They're not fixing the security issue, but at least they're documenting it" is a weird argument to make.

[–] LoganDark 1 day ago

My reply to a deleted reply:

> I'm sorry, but how is revoking a bad cert not supported in an easy way? Along with adding a cert and using it to establish a secure connection, that seems to be the core features of a cert store?

> Yet somehow, you manage to come to the conclusion that the vendor requiring manual work is the most thorough? I mean, in documenting their failure, maybe.

> With all their talk of caring about user privacy, this seems incompetent at best.

To be fair other vendors almost universally don't document their failures at all or provide any remediation steps to users whatsoever. I always enjoy the exceptions to this rule, but it's not the norm whatsoever.

You seem to be ignoring that Apple's security framework responded to the incident within about 2 hours in most cases. Safari and other macOS apps were protected right off the bat.

It's only this legacy BSD store that needs an OS update, almost certainly because they simply didn't already have a process in place to update it out-of-band. Because they're vertically integrated, they probably don't have an arbitrary do-anything feature that can paper over the lack of foresight here, like other vendors might.

I'd honestly consider that a feature, but sure, the benefits would outweigh the risks in this one particular case.

[–] 1970-01-01 1 day ago

They're doing badly because they have a market cap at 5 trillion USD ($5,070,000,000,000 to $5,110,000,000,000) and chose to ditch the first principals of a CA store. Doing impressive backflips to compensate for lack of understanding first principals is exactly that.

[–] LoganDark 1 day ago

Can you explain what first principles you mean? /etc/ssl/cert.pem has been a fairly standard convention on BSDs, and Linux distros usually have an equivalent somewhere too, like for example /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt.

I don't blame Apple for overlooking it when they have their own security stack that all their own apps use, which already responded to the incident within two hours of the revocation. As another commenter pointed out, Terminal commands probably just weren't a priority of their threat model. I do hope they fix that, but mentioning their market cap is not gonna help here.

[–] 1970-01-01 1 day ago

It's on the front page right now. Their dev tools are a complete mess when it comes to actually using the trust store as designed. Why would you dismiss this outright?

https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/apple.html

[–] LoganDark 1 day ago

I'm not saying it doesn't matter that dev tools are affected. Those are perhaps some of the most important tools and riskiest to leave vulnerable, because that could result in malware shipped to users from a trustworthy developer, or malware executed on the developer's machine, rather than simply phishing. I just don't think it's fair to assume they did it intentionally. It's a mistake, and one that should be fixed, don't get me wrong. But there's a reason it happened and that seems fair enough to me.

[–] 1970-01-01 1 day ago

In the same degree as involuntary manslaughter is not intentional murder. Sure they made a mistake. Fairness has limits when you're doing it wrong and know better.

[–] LoganDark 1 day ago

They may not have known better back then, even if by now it seems obvious.

[–] longsword 1 day ago

Where exactly is it good, that:

* apple told admins how to fix the vulnerability * apple shipped update 27.2, with no fix (today) * the update reverted the admin fix quietly

[–] LoganDark 1 day ago

The article warned of this already (re-applying the fix after updates). That update was likely already in the pipeline before this debacle. No one can say for sure though.

[–] ForHackernews 1 day ago

"AppleCar sometimes explodes on bumpy roads unless you manually disarm the bomb in the trunk before driving. If you do not drive on bumpy roads, you don't need to do anything. If you have disarmed the bomb, Apple Updates will automatically re-arm the bomb after every update. Please remember to manually disarm the bomb after each update."

It's right there in the article, look how proactive they're being!

[–] LoganDark 1 day ago

LOL'd, you're literally correct though. I could unironically see Apple doing that given just a few things. And I'd prefer it to a vendor who stays silent about it until they have a full update out, and then just calls the deaths unfortunate or something. Or like, a vendor who already has the update ready, but withholds it while people continue to blow up because an embargo is more important for some reason.

[–] darkarmani 1 day ago

> most likely their Rapid Security Responses / Background Security Improvements framework does not already support this file

Why would it support this file? Are CA trust stores really that important? /s

> and no other vendor has been nearly as thorough about this

1. That's totally not true. Apple has messed up something that is trivial to fix. 2. The EU's CRA is going to crush them if they don't get their shit together.

[–] LoganDark 1 day ago

They didn't foresee this, and that's on them, sure. But their response to this, given the situation, is just about the best I could expect from them given the circumstances.

Would it have been better if the next operating system update already shipped a fixed store rather than another broken one? Sure. Would it have been even better if they had the ability to remotely fix the store on the many millions of already online Apple devices? Absolutely. But if they couldn't do either of those things, which seems likely at this point, this is the next best thing while they get the rest of their shit in order.

I don't think it's particularly constructive to point out how everybody else has already been able to patch this in all places. Apple's clearly in a spot right now. Blame them for that, but don't blame them for picking the best option at their disposal right now.