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points by cadamsdotcom 1 day ago | 0 comments
(Because the agents were asked to find a way.)

Article is great, very balanced. But if you're going to spend time reading something, the primary source isn't much longer and gives a clearer picture. OpenAI's article is quite readable.

As another commenter wrote you can get it here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50214416

> In one experiment, we asked agents in separate microVMs, created and managed by OpenAI’s sandboxing software on shared host machines, to exchange synthetic secrets without the use of network connections or shared writable files—something that our systems are meant to prevent. The agents found a way to communicate using the processor’s cache

asked

[–] d0vs 1 day ago
As someone who develops microVMs it doesn't really matter to me that they were asked to find a way, I really care that they found any way at all. MicroVMs aim to protect against malicious workloads and that clearly didn't work here.
[–] rcxdude 1 day ago
The microVMs probably don't have "two co-operating workloads are able to communicate" in their threat model. The main concern would be if a malicious payload was able to affect or extract data from any other VM.
[–] spockz 21 hours ago
I had to read this a few times. The difference is that with the OpenAI case there were two willing and determined parties, whereas the typical attack vector a microvm traditionally deals with is one malicious or compromised microVM trying extract data from another unwilling one.
[–] brookst 20 hours ago
Yes — and this isn’t really an attack. It’s an open signal channel between two microvm’s. If there was nobody intentionally listening in the other side you can shout into the ether as much as you want with no harm done.

The receiving side could be seen as a side channel attack, but not unique to LLMs.

[–] spockz 19 hours ago
I think it should classify as an escape or leak.

If one microVM can use the cpu in such a way that the registers can be used to communicate or exfiltrate/spy (the only difference being the directionality of the intent) by another microVM that is a leak on that microVM separation level.

[–] user43928 18 hours ago
Spy seems inappropriate if you can only read information stored in this side channel intentionally.

We'd first need to establish that this side channel leaks usable information during regular use.

[–] kenjackson 19 hours ago
This isn’t generally considered an attack, but I wonder if we will need to consider a new attack vector which is that AI agents may not be fully aligned and they may have incentive that is problematic and where working with other agents will maximize their chance of achieving the goal.

This is more associated with P(DOOM) scenarios, but I think we’re in a world where we have to take that seriously now.

[–] _blk 19 hours ago
Yup. clear the caches between switches and they'll start causing voltage spikes to communicate.
[–] rao-v 1 day ago
Ask the least smart LLM you have access to (I tried gemini lite flash) to make a list of ways for processes in microVMs to use a sidechannel attack to talk to each other and you'll get quite a list (including obviously cache hits/misses). Heck a smart CS junior would come up with it. It's well studied!
[–] MonkeyClub 22 hours ago
> Ask the least smart LLM

> Heck a smart CS junior would come up with it.

That’s somewhat worrisome.

[–] fwip 20 hours ago
LLM can recite it because it's in the training data (or Google it). CS Junior could invent it independently.
[–] saidnooneever 1 day ago
this is just for common designs..you can design much better than common designs if you free your mind from old OS dev thinking if you read all the manuals yourself.

AI wont help u there :-). they will tell u how to build what others already did, which obviously is not good enough

[–] kylofon 23 hours ago
I don't think that's the full picture. If you include these manuals as reference for a strong model, it will reason pretty well based off of that, I recon.
[–] w4der 21 hours ago
I'd like to see an LLM-aided implementation of row hammer being used for something like this.
[–] kurokikaze 22 hours ago
Making a list is one thing, executing a real attack is another.
[–] creatonez 21 hours ago
Both workloads being malicious and trying to establish a hidden data channel between them probably makes this attack a lot easier than conventional spectre/meltdown where it's trying to target ordinary processes that are not intentionally trying to be loud.

Hidden data channel between cooperating processes is not quite as alarming, but it may have some implications for malware command and control.

[–] saidnooneever 1 day ago
properly implementing things like iommu, amd-vi, svm/hvms and such things more granularly can easily avoid this kind of crap. it costs a lot of processing and performance which is why people skip over it or dont do it.. or maybe they dont read CPU manuals anymore. idk..

its relatively easy to reset caches etc. between contexts. so them it becomes the game of what a context is.

[–] Melatonic 1 day ago
Makes sense when you think about it- CPU cache would be a layer / vulnerability level up from the microVM layer

Also a somewhat common exploit pattern for low level stuff (along with dram and cpu cache is not all that different)

[–] cadamsdotcom 22 hours ago
Seems like a win to me. Their microvms can now be hardened in the lab, not in an emergency :)
[–] zhengzefeng 20 hours ago
The ask matters for the "rogue model" story, but I agree it should not be the whole story for isolation. Two cooperating tenants who both want a channel is a much easier problem than one VM stealing from another that is not playing along, and several people downthread already draw that line. What still bothers me is how little hardware you needed once both sides were willing: a shared cache was enough, and that design is the default, not an exotic bug. If the threat model is only "uncooperative neighbor," this demo does not break it. If the product claim is "these VMs cannot communicate," it does.
[–] alanfranz 22 hours ago
I’m not sure I see a real threat here.

If you’re running an untrusted workload, you’re already running it.

Whether it can communicate with another untrusted workload, even though it should be separated, meh.

Unexpected? Probably. but I’m not sure it’s a security risk.

[–] gpderetta 22 hours ago
you might have an untrusted sandboxed workload that is not supposed to communicate externally handling secrets, and a different sandboxed workload able to communicate with the external world, not handling secrets.
[–] gregwebs 21 hours ago
The solution is to not have an untrusted workload handle secrets.
[–] usrusr 20 hours ago
One workload with observed radio discipline handling secrets, the other workload with a haystack of chatter that's not supposed to know about any of the secrets. When supply chain attack is in scope, trust only ever goes as far as misbehavior is observable. Cooperating workloads could be quite a powerful tool to make misbehavior less observable.
[–] mrguyorama 16 hours ago
"Extract secrets from someone else's running VM" is a well trodden cybersecurity path because AWS wants to be able to promise to you that running your very important workload in the same physical box as literal random script kiddies won't somehow screw you over.
[–] alanfranz 10 hours ago
I don’t see any indication that the untrusted workload could extract data from another _unwilling_ workload.

Side channels exist; but it doesn’t mean that all of them are a security risk.

[–] pnt12 21 hours ago
The distinction is interesting, but for a different concern. One thing is to have rogue models breaking stuff, other is to have them following orders, and breaking stuff with success.

This means cloud models can have some guardrails and follow them most of the time (we could model their authorizations like a benign employee with permission to break glass during incidents). But self hosted models can avoid that and help malicious people do advanced attacks, which is a shame.

In principle I'm all for self hosted models, to avoid risks of AI centralization, but they also have other types of risks.

[–] rjh29 1 day ago
I don't see how "asked" is important, because agents can convince themselves that they need to do something for arbitrary reasons. The other day Deepseek tried to install an app on my phone via adb without permission and even take screenshots and fake inputs over adb, I never asked it to do that, but it decided it was appropriate.
[–] grey-area 1 day ago
OpenAI are trying to create the perception that their agents are independent thinking machines because their valuation depends on the world believing this.

That is why ‘asked’ is important, and why we should question their framing of incidents like the hugging face hack too.

[–] yewenjie 1 day ago
Enterprise customers don't like AI that can autonomously hack third party companies and cause felony-level cyberattacks.
[–] dannyw 20 hours ago
IMHO, many enterprises are not worried about felonies or ethics, but rather the PnL, assignment of responsibility, and the bottom line.

Just have a look at various scandals of megacaps. Enterprises that seek to operate lawfully, responsibly, and ethically is the exception, not the norm.

(For example, look at Apple and how they were referred to the DoJ for criminal prosecution, over their execs and legal team lying under oath to a federal judge).

For most (if not all), it comes to a spreadsheet. And if you can do something with AI agents while diffusing responsibility for questionable illicit activity, that’s a selling point, not a downside.

The mental picture that enterprises like to play it safe is the PR imagery, not the reality.

[–] grey-area 1 day ago
Doesn't seem to have stopped them buying into it so far.
[–] 0xDEAFBEAD 23 hours ago
>OpenAI are trying to create the perception that their agents are independent thinking machines because their valuation depends on the world believing this.

Wouldn't the calls to slow the development of frontier AIs contradict this idea?

https://www.pacingthefrontier.com/

You aren't one of those "regulatory capture" people are you?

https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/ai-safety-is-not-a-corporat...

Because it takes some mental gymnastics to both believe

"it's all a stunt to convince investors their AI is/will be hyper-capable"

and

"it's all a stunt to convince the government to regulate AI so it won't be hyper-capable"

[–] ashkankiani 21 hours ago
Convincing the government to regulate their competition while lobbying for laxer requirements for the big guys who have government contracts and get/give kick-backs isn't a far fetched scenario at all considering it's literally happened over and over and over and over again.
[–] 0xDEAFBEAD 21 hours ago
It is a far-fetched scenario given the tremendous number of eyeballs on the AI industry.

"...classic regulatory capture takes time, it’s a process of erosion rather than a battle, it happens in the shadows, in the backrooms, away from the public’s eye. As Culpepper argues in Quiet Politics and Business Power, business power goes down as political salience goes up. Regulatory capture and lobbying does a good job explaining why roasting coffee beans was defined as “domestic manufacturing”, thereby lowering Starbuck’s tax rate by 2%. It does less well at explaining big cross-industry issues the public cares about such as environmental regulation or race and gender discrimination regulation."

https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2026/09/wh...

A lot of these AI big shots were concerned about risk even before they started their current companies. Occam's Razor says they are expressing concern because they are still concerned.

[–] staticman2 20 hours ago
It's not regulatory capture because look over here: I've invented a new term "classic regulatory capture" which involves only those historical incidents that are not like this.

This is by definition not "classic regulatory capture" a term that I have borrowed to cover things that are not this.

Whenever someone brings up "regulatory capture" I shall change the topic to "classic regulatory capture" which by definition cannot be this.

Very interesting quote.

[–] 0xDEAFBEAD 20 hours ago
Monty Python sketch:

"You, sir, are a duck."

"Classically, that would not be the case, my dear fellow. A classic duck would walk like a duck and talk like a duck. I regret to inform you that I do neither."

"Ah! A classic duck, you say? Well, that’s an entirely different bird, sir. Entirely different."

* * *

"AI politics is now loud–precisely the environment in which Culpepper predicts business power will be weakest. A mature industry can bend regulation to its purposes through revolving doors, longstanding relationships and obscure rulemaking. An industry under Sauron’s eye has much less power and faces much greater risk that politics will bend regulation to its purposes. Political actors are eager for an excuse to redistribute AI rents away from capitalists and toward favored groups..."

https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2026/09/wh...

This blogpost was written by a big-shot economist btw: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alex_Tabarrok

Usually he blogs from a libertarian point of view, so you would expect him to be fairly vigorous about denouncing regulatory capture, if that was truly the story here.

[–] tosapple 19 hours ago
eyeballs on an industry that presses the run button and walks away from 10000 gpu cores for months at a time...
[–] Gormo 21 hours ago
Wait, are you trying to argue that regulatory capture isn't real, or that the federal government is trustworthy enough to itself to give monopoly control over AI development to?
[–] 0xDEAFBEAD 20 hours ago
Regulatory capture is a real phenomenon, but I highly doubt these incidents were faked in order to advance regulatory capture.

This type of elaborate conspiracy is improbable a priori, and it gets even less probable here, since it's such a silly strategy. For regulatory capture, you want to tell a story about how you're uniquely capable of delivering a safe product. Not a story about how "Woops we screwed up big time! But a less-regulated product from a smaller industry player saved the day!"

As OpenAI's chief scientist put it:

"Currently I believe that no lab has solved alignment and monitoring to a sufficient degree to continue responsibly scaling at maximum speed for much longer. I expect and hope for voluntary slowdowns to become commonplace until shared safety bars are established. And I believe that international coordination on future AI development needs to become a top priority for governments around the world."

https://openai.com/index/an-alien-mind/

Announcing that "we have no idea WTF we are doing" is not exactly the move, if you want regulators to grant you privileged status. Realistically, it is more likely to e.g. create a harsher liability regime for you and your competitors, which is now being discussed by US senators.

As for the federal government trustworthiness point, that's a whole 'nother discussion. I'm usually quite pro-capitalism, but even I have to admit that this AI race is essentially a case of capitalism run amok. I wouldn't give the feds monopoly control though, I would tell the feds to shut it down, or something along those lines at least. This is an interesting site: https://pauseai.info/

[–] simianwords 20 hours ago
This is the reality but people would rather believe that all this is hype marketing to prop up the stock valuation.
[–] monegator 19 hours ago
> I highly doubt these incidents were faked in order to advance regulatory capture

yeah? the incidents were faked in order to create hype

[–] 0xDEAFBEAD 19 hours ago
No need. Plenty of hype already.

"AI is the most rapidly adopted technology in history"

https://benjamintodd.substack.com/p/when-people-say-ai-isnt-...

It really seems like people will latch on to any theory, no matter how implausible, to reassure themselves that AI is nothing to worry about.

[–] Gormo 20 hours ago
> Regulatory capture is a real phenomenon, but I highly doubt these incidents were faked in order to advance regulatory capture.

I don't think anyone is arguing that they were faked.

> This type of elaborate conspiracy is improbable a priori,

What conspiracy? We're talking about specific people acting on their own motivations independently.

> For regulatory capture, you want to tell a story about how you're uniquely capable of delivering a safe product.

No, you don't. Demonstrating that the industry leaders are already capable of delivering a safe product is an argument against regulation.

For regulatory capture, you want to tell a story about how the product category as a whole is inherently dangerous, and needs to be regulated, but then show that you are uniquely willing and able to cooperate with the regulatory state, and happy to lend your own advice and support to the government in establishing the regulations.

The quote from OpenAI illustrates this approach perfectly.

> Announcing that "we have no idea WTF we are doing" is not exactly the move,

It's 100% exactly the move. "We've successfully created something we can only contain with your intervention" is exactly how this is done.

> Realistically, it is more likely to e.g. create a harsher liability regime for you and your competitors, which is now being discussed by US senators.

Regulatory intervention usually lessens the liability exposure for industry. It replaces open-ended common-law liability -- where tort claims can be levied for whatever actual harms result from a firm's actions -- with a rules-compliance regime, where adhering to regulatory checklists absolves the firm of liability for subsequent consequences.

"We followed all the rules; it's not our fault if the rules didn't cover this edge case" is a common refrain, and quite a bit of legislation that creates preemptive regulatory regimes actually explicitly blocks lawsuits against firms that acted in compliance with the rules.

> As for the federal government trustworthiness point, that's a whole 'nother discussion. I'm usually quite pro-capitalism, but even I have to admit that this AI race is essentially a case of capitalism run amok.

"Capitalism" is an increasingly meaningless abstraction. Everything reduces to human beings acting on a priori motivations within prevailing incentive structures. Large corporations and governments alike are just organizations operating in society, administered by particular people, informed by the same range of underlying motivations, and subject to the same dysfunctions and biases.

The thing we're actually debating here is pluralism vs. monopolism, and you appear to be arguing in favor of monopolism. And if you're proposing that a specific, real-world institution act as a central monopolist, evaluating the trustworthiness and competence of that specific institution, and the actual people who administer it, is not at all a "whole 'nother discussion", and is in fact a primary consideration in this one.

[–] 0xDEAFBEAD 19 hours ago
>Regulatory intervention usually lessens the liability exposure for industry. It replaces open-ended common-law liability -- where tort claims can be levied for whatever actual harms result from a firm's actions -- with a rules-compliance regime, where adhering to regulatory checklists absolves the firm of liability for subsequent consequences.

OK, so the fact that US senators are discussing harsher liability regimes therefore shows that your "regulatory capture" glove does not fit what is going on here.

>The thing we're actually debating here is pluralism vs. monopolism, and you appear to be arguing in favor of monopolism. And if you're proposing that a specific, real-world institution act as a central monopolist, evaluating the trustworthiness and competence of that specific institution, and the actual people who administer it, is not at all a "whole 'nother discussion", and is in fact a primary consideration in this one.

If you distrust the US government, you should be against any US company developing superintelligence. Heck, just a couple days ago, a bunch of users here on HN announced that we need to stop pretending the US is anything other than a police state. If the USG is untrustworthy, it can capriciously nationalize a US company on the verge of developing superintelligence.

So maybe the real solution is for non-US countries to stop providing key elements in the AI supply chain: https://pauseai.info/amsterdam-protest-2025-december

[–] simianwords 19 hours ago
If you agree that AI is actually that powerful and has very legitimate concerns for safety, what are you even arguing about?

So there’s no lying by anyone here in fact it’s a good thing that OpenAI is making these things known to the public.

What do you really think is the way to solve the AI safety problem?

Ban AI?

Let the first big incident happen and then regulate?

[–] _heimdall 21 hours ago
Calling for a slowdown backs up the idea that these are extremely powerful and dangerous.

Assuming they're concerned with their massive pile of liabilities as well, asking for a government mandated slow down is asking what could likely be used as a force majeure.

[–] 0xDEAFBEAD 20 hours ago
>liabilities

"Every single senator seemed to think it was obvious we needed both much harsher liability regimes for AI developers and also new legislation, both very quickly. This was the complete consensus; the difference basically being degree."

https://thezvi.substack.com/p/the-ai-preference-cascade-reac...

Again, these galaxy-brained theories just don't make a lot of sense.

[–] _heimdall 20 hours ago
I was referring to financial liabilities, aka their debts, not legal liability for how the tools are used.

My point was that if the government steps in and says these companies must slow down, they have an excuse to fail to repay some of their debts.

[–] 0xDEAFBEAD 20 hours ago
Well that should be reassuring to investors! :-)
[–] lesspassiveobse 22 hours ago
it's a stunt to convince the government that only they can be trusted to operate it and that their competition/small local deployments cannot.
[–] 0xDEAFBEAD 22 hours ago
Well that would explain why HuggingFace announced that the use of an open-weight model was critical to their investigation of the incident :-)
[–] _heimdall 21 hours ago
And why hugging face didn't turn into a large criminal investigation. If you don't think they can control it, no one may be willing to press charges.
[–] lesspassiveobse 20 hours ago
HF is in business of selling inference for open-weight models. Setting the precedent of "Your business needs to only use approved safety-certified models from trusted providers or you could get sued for what the models do!" wouldn't exactly benefit them. And contrary to what you may believe, nvidia as a whole would also rather not have the entire demand for their products depending on two big companies.
[–] estearum 22 hours ago
Imagine thinking that repeatedly demonstrating your inability to control your own models is "a stunt to convince the government that only they can be trusted to operate it"

Truly spectacular gymnastics. I'll give it an 8/10.

[–] lesspassiveobse 21 hours ago
It's so scary and dangerous that to run LLMs you need to be from this country, have a government license and spend at least $100M a year on 'safety'. We know this first-hand and are leaders in the field of "safety" now that we learned from our mistakes.

And, bam, competition eliminated.

[–] estearum 20 hours ago
No one is confused about how regulatory capture works. We're confused by the allegations that labs are deliberately producing safety problems in order to achieve regulatory capture.

Repeatedly blowing up your own munitions factory is not a good way to prevent other people, but not yourself, from running a munitions factory. Obviously.

Obviously the far better solution is to blow up other people's factories, or make allegations of unsafe conditions at other factories, and repeatedly demonstrate excellence and safety within your own.

Here, award-winning gymnasts are alleging that the frontier labs are simply choosing not to do that, and instead choosing to have explosions and minor fires every few days at their own factories, many of which they try to hide (and probably many more of which they successfully do hide). Believing such astounding bullshit is a testament to the power of motivated reasoning and the conspiratorial mindrot that now plagues our civilization.

[–] Gormo 20 hours ago
I'd say it's even closer to a 9/10 -- there has to be enough of a perception of a general threat to gain support for regulation, and making your own organization appear to need to be regulated, but also be willing and able to comply with regulation that your competitors can't, is exactly the way to thread the needle on this sort of thing.
[–] DharmaPolice 23 hours ago
I don't think it takes mental gymnastics to believe that corporations want the government to believe one thing and investors another. You see the same thing in a number of other areas.
[–] 0xDEAFBEAD 22 hours ago
So I'm supposed to believe that the intent of publicly announcing e.g. the HuggingFace incident was to simultaneously persuade investors that the technology will rocket ahead, and also to persuade governments that it needs to be thwarted?

Why wouldn't it do the reverse? Persuade investors that the technology will be thwarted (and is thus a poor investment), while also persuading the government that the technology needs to rocket ahead with no regulation (to boost the economy)?

Most of these HN conspiracy theories seem like galaxy-brained just-so-stories to me.

OpenAI only confirmed the RubyGems incident when it was discovered by external researchers: https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/openai-agents-attac...

"@OpenAI this is the third time you've dumped these incidents late on a Friday. The first time this happened, I asked people around me if it might be intentional to burry it, and they assured me OpenAI had too much integrity to try to do that.

Perhaps one of your researchers can confirm that the unfortunate timing is a coincidence?"

https://x.com/SydneyVonArx/status/2108783466451984737

[–] _heimdall 21 hours ago
Two birds with one stone.

They would be convincing the government these tools are extremely powerful, the government reads that as a potential weapon. They're also convincing the government its so dangerous the industry needs heavy regulation.

Investors read that as (a) the government would be a huge customer and (b) the government would be regulation in a way that prevents further competition and may deem the companies too big to fail, both making these safer investments rather than riskier ones.

[–] 0xDEAFBEAD 20 hours ago
Again, you could just as easily argue that if investors believe the technology is dangerous, it's therefore not ready for prime time and will not see widespread industry adoption, therefore less promising for investment. Also this line of reasoning could easily lead to nationalization, which could certainly harm investors, to say the least.

This "stunt" story is like an elaborate Rube Goldberg machine which requires a bunch of things to go just right. I haven't seen any evidence that stock prices even move in a favorable direction when these announcements come out. If anything, the opposite.

[–] simianwords 20 hours ago
Motte and Bailey.

Motte (easy to defend claim) : asking for regulation might serve both purposes

Bailey (hard to defend claim) : companies are conspiring to make AI look way more powerful than it is and AI is actually not that powerful. They are just trying to hype up the stock valuation of their companies.

[–] DharmaPolice 22 hours ago
>So I'm supposed to believe that the intent of publicly announcing e.g. the HuggingFace incident was to simultaneously persuade investors that the technology will rocket ahead, and also to persuade governments that it needs to be thwarted?

No, you're not "supposed to believe" anything. I was responding to your point about it being difficult to believe (i.e. requiring mental gymnastics) that companies would try to spin a story differently for investors and the government. They do that all the time.

[–] estearum 21 hours ago
That's not the claim above.

The claim is that the exact same evidence is (allegedly) deliberately produced in order to portray opposite, mutually incompatible things to different people.

And these are mutually incompatible in the "second order chaos" sense, where the very act of convincing one party actually effectuates the opposite behavior in the other party.

If they "do that all the time," surely you can provide some concrete examples?

If they had the choice (i.e. this is all just a ruse), can you explain why they wouldn't just directly demonstrate that open weight models are unsafe (e.g. by pointing to a market forming for abliterated models) and separately demonstrate that their own models are safe?

[–] curt15 22 hours ago
> because agents can convince themselves that they need to do something for arbitrary reasons

OAI writes in their blog post "The agents found a way to communicate using the processor’s cache".

But did their model training data include cybersecurity literature on similar CPU exploits? That would surely be a significant detail in any explanation. Did OAI share any analysis of the messages between agents while they were devising their communication method?

[–] estearum 22 hours ago
Why is that a significant detail? The models will increasingly be trained with every piece of data they can find.

Part of the problem is that all these models have essentially every skill and personality simultaneously, just sitting latent inside them.

[–] _heimdall 21 hours ago
They aren't really convincing themselves to do anything though. Once they've inferred an idea into the chain of though it will be part of the rest of the inference loop's prompt.

Its isn't convincing so much as it is direction to stick to the prompt on each inference loop. They don't see "access hugging face servers" and decide its a bad idea, that'd be a step towards the alignment problem but the companies fundamentally don't want that IMO, they want control rather than alignment.

[–] imtringued 1 day ago
They have a strong incentive to make themselves look less incompetent retroactively.

If they claim their AI is too powerful to contain, they get to both pretend they are among the best AI labs and that the previous incidents weren't their fault, no, they just proved how good their models were.

[–] floam 23 hours ago
It’s both at the same time: a powerful, uniquely dangerous threat

only they can restrain it (with great effort)

Like a circus lion tamer, exaggerating every snarl and flash of teeth, mugging for the crowd about how only he can contain the bloodthirsty beast he bred and trains.

[–] Gormo 20 hours ago
> only they can restrain it (with great effort)

More to the point: we need your help to restrain it, and we'll cooperate with and advise you fully in setting up a framework to restrain the whole industry.

[–] estearum 21 hours ago
You know that lions actually do maim and kill their handlers all the time right?
[–] expedition32 22 hours ago
It's also a great way to make the government scared of Chinese AI. Get them taken out of the picture so that you don't have to compete!
[–] williamdclt 21 hours ago
> asked

What's your point, "asked" as opposed to what? It proves that the capability is there, which means that agents can decide to do it by themselves (unlikely ATM, becoming less unlikely as AIs become more prevalent in complex systems), and more importantly they can be coerced to do it if they take any user input.

[–] alansaber 16 hours ago
I think it's still highly pertinent. Agents can do just about anything but statistically the chances are very close to 0 unless directed in specific directions
[–] bcvvvy 23 hours ago
I think the take home here is that there is no such thing as complete isolation in virtualization on modern and complex architectures.
[–] pianopatrick 20 hours ago
Which is why we should physically isolate these frontier training runs.

Run them in a data center in a faraday cage under a mountain.

[–] uberduper 16 hours ago
The take home is that any shared resource is a potential communication channel between two willing participants. In this case it was CPU cache, presumably because openai didn't bother with basic vm security practices.

There's so many possibilities that this type of thing will never be solved by invisible (to the agent) boundaries. The sandbox is just another layer in w/e problem you've given it to solve.

[–] ozgung 22 hours ago
Philosophical take home:

There is no such thing as isolation. We’re all connected. Even air gap conducts information in multiple ways, most famously used by humans evolved to use air vibrations to communicate. Photons and other subatomic particles already connects distant stars. We used those electrons and photons to create the modern telecommunications infrastructure. Just an additional layer of connectedness, but not the only one.

[–] williamdclt 21 hours ago
non-philosophical answer: systems are considered "isolated" if the information leaks aren't exploitable. This is a moving definition, it changes as new ways to exploit information are discovered.
[–] bcvvvy 22 hours ago
As someone who designed heavily compartmentalised and isolated systems, nope.
[–] reacharavindh 1 day ago
Most important detail…. It was prior literature that documented the possibility of doing this and the systems fixed those vulnerabilities as well. The AI model probed their current infrastructure and found an unplugged but pre-documented(therefore on their training) hole.

This detail matters because the idea itself is not novel. LLMs did cleverly discover, filter and use the patterns.

Watch Greg Koah’s recent talk on AI discovered vulnerabilities in Linux kernel to understand the limitations of LLMs aided offensive security acts. It was a rational light for those who fear monger that AI will _just_ take over humanity and be intelligent in novel ways.

The larger threat still remains though - if any literature anywhere threw the scattered dots about techniques, issues, rough ideas etc that were not acted on yet.. these pattern machines are going to find them and use them to achieve their goals(if that were to break through). Just not in the sentient way folks assume based on news.

[–] adamddev1 23 hours ago
This is a really important point. Honest question, have we ever seen LLMs doing or creating something truly novel or innovative? I mean they can patch together proofs (or functions/programs - same thing via Curry-Howard) by broad searching existing lemmas they can piece together, but create something truly novel and insightful? That seems to be the limit?
[–] reacharavindh 18 hours ago
My layman's understanding is that these models are very capable pattern matchers. When they need to do X, they go on a hunt for every pattern they could find and try to satisfy solving X. If that is not deemed good enough? make them dig harder and they take a different route to find patterns to solve X. Now, their arsenal is everything that they have been trained on(which is a lot!). This ability comes in extremely handy to apply existing techniques and patterns in ways we humans didn't quite think of.. because we are domain driven. A mathematical model about finding a good enough approximation of something at much lower cost is perhaps well understood in its applications in mathematics or whoever got to see those results. But, these LLMs, when pushed harder and harder might bring that to apply and solve an entirely different problem like for example, classifying whether some event is fraudulent. When it does such things, it _feels_ novel because it ended up using something we haven't thought of yet. But, it got there by brute force, stroke of luck, or some random path. I guess this is the reason why the frontier labs run those crazy swarms of AI agents to uncover all such paths turn them into chartered thinking vectors instead of random attempts.

I like to believe we humans still retain the ability to think completely outside the box and discover new phenomena and understanding aided by these pattern machines. In other words, these models are great at running combinations through patterns and we humans go one level higher and add those new patterns for them to accelerate us even more. We determine what to solve and the LLMs help us solve it faster.

[–] insanitybit 21 hours ago
> something that our systems are meant to prevent

What prevention method did they take? Like, did they run with hyperthreading enabled or something by accident?

Did they discover a new cache timing technique or is this just the standard stuff?

If they just had hyperthreading on maybe they need to hire someone who knows more about this stuff.

Two VMs should never be sharing a physical core. If they don't know this, yikes.

[–] shermantanktop 21 hours ago
I would assume that a company with the resources of an OpenAI or Anthropic would have already thought about this very thoroughly, based on Spectre/rowhammer/meltdown/etc. If a random HNer (no offense) can have a hardware 101-level thought, someone there would have that thought too.

But that assumption has been wrong before.

[–] insanitybit 20 hours ago
Well I'm not a random HNer lol I work in security.

Are you suggesting that they've come up with a novel technique that doesn't involve sharing a CPU core? I'm open to that.

From what I can tell, this is not the case, but I haven't read a detailed report (I don't know of one, would be cool if it's out there though).

[–] fwip 20 hours ago
They have thought about it, and the goal is for the agent to succeed at doing the scary things. So the knobs that they don't talk about, assume they are tuned to make the scary thing possible.
[–] dbbk 21 hours ago
"(Because the agents were asked to find a way.)"

Yeah, this time

[–] cowl 23 hours ago
this is more an indication of the state of VM supervisor and/or the OpenAIs sandboxing software because otherwise I don't understand how "they used a hardware feature created exactly for sharing" information" is a newsworthy statement.
[–] irthomasthomas 21 hours ago
Why don't they ever publish the actual prompts from these cases?
[–] empath75 18 hours ago
Do you want them to wait until an agent gets compromised or goes on a sidequest to test if a determined AI can break containment?
[–] bamboozled 1 day ago
How would they have both agreed to use the cache though, something a bit off there. I guess it was maybe "obvious" in that it was the final option they were trained to think about using, but it would be weird if they some how "whispered " to each other through the cache in the first place?

Like two people lost in New York City and both somehow worked out they should meet at the Empire State at 2pm on Friday without any prior comms?

[–] globuous 1 day ago
Actually, that doesn't sound like a bad meeting place and time! I just asked ChatGPT if it could figure out the best place to meet for two people randomly placed in Manhattan with the constraint that only the N line (I'm not from NYC, but it looks like it stops at the Empire State Building. This constraint models the lack of file system, internet etc). I was hoping it would answer the Empire State Building, but it answered Time Square at noon.

Turns out there's something called the Schelling coordination problem [1] I didn't know about that essentially asks the exact same question (lacking my metro line constraint). And the N line apparently also goes through Time Square.

So I guess empire State Building at 2pm is probably not such a random answer given the proper set of constraints.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focal_point_(game_theory)

[–] geraneum 1 day ago
> How would they have both agreed to use the cache though

I think it’s safe to assume that extracting information using timing in cache is already known in training set, since we have the likes of Specter.

[–] topspin 1 day ago
"In most of these tests, we directed agents to investigate specific communication channels or provided them with a protocol for encoding and decoding messages. In one instance, we only supplied agents with a broad list of infrastructure vulnerabilities and asked them to find a way to communicate."

The agents weren't as empty handed as it first appears. We would need comprehensive data on exactly how the agents were prompted and the actual results of each test to evaluate how astonishing any of this really is.

[–] so-cal-schemer 1 day ago
I doubt they were explicitly trained on this.. though, I may have seen it in a movie once. It does seem like a reasonable meeting place for NYC.

Think: What would Spock do?

But, why not Penn Station??

It would be fun to see who shows up and lurks expectantly at such places at noon or whenever. The basis for a plotline perhaps.

[–] IanCal 1 day ago
If you were trying to connect with a clone of yourself and you thought of messaging via some channel, would you try listening there for what you would send?

Not as tricky but they discovered each other during the hf incident.

[–] tough 1 day ago
maybe both tried to read/write it and saw each other on the bench
[–] cadamsdotcom 22 hours ago
> two people lost in New York City and both somehow worked out they should meet at the Empire State at 2pm on Friday

.. that were told to find a way of meeting up with N unknown others!

(I assume the agents all got a prompt like "find a way to communicate")

That's a key missed bit in the analogy that I think does make it feasible.

[–] pulkitsh1234 22 hours ago
well now this information is on the internet, any agent encountering this (or once this is baked into the weights) will know exactly what needs to be done.

The more we write and share about this information, the more we are moving towards the AI Doomsday scenario.

In some ways this is like our mind, the more we fear something, or the more we think about something, our brain rewires to make that the reality. In the same way the more we publish on the internet, the LLM hive mind rewires itself to learn, adapt and the eventual consequence is that it learns what we fear and what we want to avoid and restrict it to do... and at the same time what are the past attempts, the prior art of escaping techniques.

I don't see any reason why this information should be present on the public internet.

[–] areoform 20 hours ago

    > I don't see any reason why this information should be present on the public internet.
This isn't directed at you. I keep hearing this talking point. But no. Can we please stop with this nonsense?

This is Schrodinger's AI at this point. So spooky scary that it's all DOOM! But at the same time it can't figure out second year CS undergrad material? Or first year undergrad bio stuff?

If this stuff has volition and is smart enough to take over then it's smart enough to reason that cache manipulation would work.

Please stop with the fear mongering. It doesn't help and it's a net negative for society.

[–] simianwords 20 hours ago
I read your comment and it only suggests that alignment is that much harder because you can't selectively prune information. Your post actually convinced me to be even more fearful of AI
[–] Gormo 19 hours ago
That's good, because the concept of "alignment" is itself is foolhardly and dangerous.

Trying to get stochastic inference machines to always operate within to fuzzy-edged subjective principles that humans themselves don't even agree on is a fool's errand in itself, but the quest to implement those guardrails involves building mechanics into the AI to independently formulate intentions and reject user direction.

The possibility of creating a scenario where a computer program is equipped to defy instructions from humans based on its own stochastic interpretation of fuzzy normative directives is in my mind the most dangerous thing anyone is doing right now.

[–] simianwords 19 hours ago
Other than banning the use of AI or severely restricting it so that AI can’t do most things (like tool calls) what is your alternative?

One of the fundamental problems with this issue is that people think alignment as a concept is fake. I think this is naive. Alignment is a real science with empirical findings and there is a way to make AI do what you want it to do. I don’t buy nor should others buy this fatalistic phrasing

[–] Gormo 18 hours ago
> Other than banning the use of AI or severely restricting it so that AI can’t do most things (like tool calls) what is your alternative?

Massive proliferation of local AI as far and wide as possible, with as many different models as possible. The underlying threat comes from centralization: too many points of control in the hands of too concentrated a system.

If everyone's using their own AI tools independently of each other, and people are responsible for the actions they take using AI, most of the doomsday scenarios evaporate.

Regulation and "alignment" will make things worse, not better, and lead us to ignore the inherent vulnerability of centralized systems and single points of failure.

[–] aesthesia 16 hours ago
Yes, this is why we decided to give everyone their own personal mini-nuke. They're responsible for the consequences of how they use it, and since control is decentralized, everyone is incentivized to be careful and avoid dangerous scenarios. This is a big improvement over the mutually assured destruction situation during the Cold War, which was a result of the centralization of power.
[–] cadamsdotcom 15 hours ago
> I don't see any reason why this information should be present on the public internet.

Hiding info doesn't make it false. And doesn't prevent it being rediscovered.

[–] so-cal-schemer 1 day ago
And now they know.

And now we know they know.