For the record I use OpenClaw but it has its own services (gmail address, phone number, etc.) and I don't give it any of mine, which inherently limits its capabilities.
[–] andai 7 hours ago
[–] simonw 6 hours ago
The open challenge is how to prove it!
[–] epicureanideal 2 hours ago
It could be proven by Anthropic backed credit cards with terms that protect users if it’s leaked or an agent misuses it.
[–] delis-thumbs-7e 5 hours ago
[–] computably 3 hours ago
[–] klysm 4 hours ago
[–] julianlam 3 hours ago
I like it!
IIRC he had his identity stolen a bunch.
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> In 2005, Davis and Robert Maynard Jr. cofounded LifeLock,[10] a personal fraud protection company.[11] Davis was CEO of LifeLock since its founding. As part of a marketing campaign to promote his company's credit monitoring services, Davis posted his own social security number[12] on billboards and commercials. As a result, he was a victim of at least 13 cases of identity theft between 2007 and 2008, belying LifeLock's claims that its services protect consumers against identity theft and fraud.[13] The Federal Trade Commission imposed a $12 million penalty on the company for deceptive advertising, likening Davis and LifeLock marketers to "con artists."[14]
[–] mbesto 5 hours ago
[–] skinfaxi 4 hours ago
[–] jeremyjh 5 hours ago
[–] yunwal 4 hours ago
[–] cyanydeez 4 hours ago
[–] simianwords 3 hours ago
[–] simianwords 3 hours ago
[–] ryoshu 6 hours ago
[–] pkaye 6 hours ago
[–] andai 6 hours ago
The former seems to be a much bigger problem. I've seen lots of reports of "Claude/codex bypassed security / stole API keys to complete a task", where that was the "intended" behavior — at least from the LLM's POV, trained to persist and complete user's task at all costs.*
I've actually seen zero reports of actual hijacking due to prompt injection, though they must be out there too.
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* See also the recent thing about how every model was willing to do fraud to get a refund:
[–] NikolaNovak 2 hours ago
The agent crawls some websites and reads some stuff and pushes some buttons. It's my limited understanding that you have
1. Hard limits like "file system permissions" (* never mind it going around for sake of this conversation)
3. On other hand of spectrum, fundamentally soft limits like a prompt "and ask me before you purchase "
2. And then in the middle you have harness enforced limits like "it won't do X with approval"... Those are being sold as hard limits but frequently they have classifiers and heuristics that essentially try to figure out which button on some third party website constitutes a "purchase" and triggers the harness limit.
Bottom line - I don't think such limits are as 100% fool proof as they are advertised / interpreted.
Very happy to be explained wrong :).
[–] staller 5 hours ago
[–] FireBeyond 4 hours ago
It said "Done, you can open the local dev instance and see the changes".
I could not.
So I asked it. "Well, no, you're not able to see those changes because they're not on that branch or committed."
"But I told you to do that and you said you had."
Claude's verbatim reply?
"You're right. You asked me to do that and I said I would, then told you I had done it, but I had not. Would you like me to do it now, then?"
[–] epicureanideal 2 hours ago
[–] epicureanideal 2 hours ago
Vendors could provide terms by API, MCP, or just in writing on the page where agents could read it, how quickly a confirmation is needed or what the terms of the reservation or purchase are.
[–] neuronexmachina 3 hours ago
[–] BryantD 7 hours ago
[–] edot 2 hours ago
[–] yako21000 2 hours ago
[–] R_D_Olivaw 5 hours ago
[–] largbae 7 hours ago
It does research on products or real estate that I am interested in, it builds apps and other software projects for me, and does structured research on any topic. Information comes back to me via Slack, GitHub PRs, or websites/services served on the Mac that Hermes runs on.
Using an agent from Slack also adds a killer feature: multi-player contexts. I can work on changes with other human collaboators right in the same thread.
[–] dominotw 7 hours ago
[–] simianwords 3 hours ago
so is it normalized for people to sneer at folks who happen to be ahead of the curve now?
[–] dominotw 2 hours ago
[–] simianwords 1 hour ago
You’d have probably sneered at the suggestion that this would be possible in 2024. You’d be wrong then and you’d be wrong again now.
https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/
The "lethal trifecta": To be useful, an agent needs internet access, untrusted inputs, and your private information.
So it can get prompt injected and exfiltrate your data. (Indeed I read that Claude Code puts your email address into HTTP requests it makes to random servers?)
My solution here was to just not give it anything, but that does preclude the "my claw bought a car!" result everyone's excited about.
My way of thinking here is "blast radius". Assume it will get prompt injected. What goes wrong? Then design the setup so that scenario is not bad. e.g. it has my keys but they've got $5 of credit on them. It has access to the filesystem, but only on its own Linux account. (Ok I set this up last year before they could communicate thru the bloody CPU cache, might need an update :)